State of Florida v. Steven W. Montgomery (SC09-332)

SUMMARY: 7-0 Decision. The 1st DCA certified the follwoing question of great public importance: IS THE STATE REQUIRED TO PROVE THAT THE DEFENDANT INTENDED TO KILL THE VICTIM IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH THE CRIME OF MANSLAUGHTER BY ACT? No. As to intent, the State only needs to prove the defendant intended to commit the act itself, not the death. The former standard jury instruction that included the element "Defendant intentionally caused the death of the victim" was incorrect.

In Montgomery's prosecution for first degree murder, the jury was given the standard instructions for lesser included offenses. Those instructions were for second degree murder and the incorrect instruction for manslaughter. The jury convicted Montgomery of second degree murder. The 1st DCA held it was fundamental error to give the jury the wrong instruction for manslaughter and overturned Montgomery's second degree murder conviction. The 1st DCA remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. The Court approved the 1st DCA's decision and answered the certified question in the negative.

Montgomery appealed his conviction and sentence to the First District Court of Appeal where he raised four issues, including a challenge to the standard jury instruction on manslaughter. Asserting that the crime of manslaughter by act does

not require an intent to kill, Montgomery argued that the trial court committed fundamental error in instructing the jury on the elements of manslaughter by act because the standard jury instruction required the State to prove that he intended to cause the death of Ellis. The district court ruled solely on the issue of the standard jury instruction on manslaughter and held that the instruction erroneously required a finding that Montgomery intended to kill Ellis. Moreover, the district court concluded that in Montgomery‘s case, the use of the erroneous manslaughter instruction constituted fundamental error. Consequently, the court reversed Montgomery‘s conviction and sentence for second-degree murder and remanded the case to the trial court. In doing so, the district court certified a question of great public importance and certified conflict with a decision from the Fifth District Court of Appeal.

First, we conclude that under Florida law, the crime of manslaughter by act does not require that the State prove that the defendant intended to kill the victim.

Second,

we address whether the language in the standard jury instruction required proof of Montgomery‘s intent to kill Ellis. At the time of Montgomery‘s trial in 2007, the standard jury instruction on manslaughter by act provided in relevant part:

To prove the crime of Manslaughter, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. (Victim) is dead. 2. a. (Defendant) intentionally caused the death of (victim). . . . . However, the defendant cannot be guilty of manslaughter if the killing was either justifiable or excusable homicide as I have previously explained those terms. In order to convict of manslaughter by intentional act, it is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had a premeditated intent to cause death.

Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.7 (2006)

Both parties and the district court agree that this jury instruction required the jury to find that the defendant intended to kill the victim in order to convict Montgomery of manslaughter. The focus of our analysis is on the second element of the jury instruction, which provided that the State must prove that the defendant intentionally caused the death of the victim. Although the instruction also provided that ―it is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had a premeditated intent to cause death, we conclude that this language was insufficient to erode the import of the second element: that the jury must find that

the defendant intended to cause the death of the victim. We agree with the district court‘s observation in Montgomery that a reasonable jury would believe that in order to convict Montgomery of manslaughter by act, it had to find that he intended to kill Ellis.

Third, we discuss whether the use of the standard manslaughter jury instruction constituted fundamental error in Montgomery‘s case. Montgomery was entitled to an accurate instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter. The instruction in this case, requiring the jury to find that Montgomery intended to kill Ellis, erroneously explained Florida law on manslaughter by act. Moreover, it was ―pertinent or material to what the jury must consider in order to convict. Thus, we conclude that fundamental error occurred in this case, where Montgomery was indicted and tried for first-degree murder and ultimately convicted of second-degree murder after the jury was erroneously instructed on the lesser included offense of manslaughter.

In conclusion, we approve the decision of the First District Court of Appeal to the extent that it held that manslaughter by act does not require proof that the defendant intended to kill the victim and concluding that in this case, the use of the standard jury instruction on manslaughter constituted fundamental error. We

answer the certified question in the negative and hold that the crime of manslaughter by act does not require that the State prove that the defendant intended to kill the victim. We further hold that the intent which the State must prove for the purpose of manslaughter by act is the intent to commit an act that was not justified or excusable, which caused the death of the victim. Moreover, we conclude that the use of the standard jury instruction on manslaughter constituted fundamental, reversible error in Montgomery‘s case and requires that Montgomery receive a new trial. Given our resolution of the certified question, we do not reach the certified conflict.