Donald Bradley appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. He also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the circuit court‘s order denying Bradley‘s motion for postconviction relief, and we deny Bradley‘s petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Bradley raised eighteen claims in his postconviction motion but seeks review of only four in this Court. First, Bradley contends trial counsel failed to fully investigate and utilize the duct tape evidence, resulting in a flawed decision as to the proper defense theory. Second, he asserts counsel‘s act of withholding certain mental illness evidence from defense experts and the trial judge constituted ineffective assistance because disclosing such evidence could have allowed for a finding of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Third, Bradley argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve for direct appeal the argument that he could not be found guilty of burglary because the victim‘s wife invited him into the house; and that under this Court‘s later decision in Delgado v. State, 776 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 2000), the initial consent for entry could not be deemed revoked after he and the McWhite brothers committed crimes against the victim. Fourth, Bradley contends the cumulative effect of counsel‘s errors amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.
BRADLEY’S 3.851 CLAIMS
As we have explained before, the test when assessing the actions of trial counsel is not how, in hindsight, present counsel would have proceeded. See Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 1069, 1073 (Fla. 1995). On the contrary, a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel must satisfy two criteria. First, counsel‘s performance must be shown to be deficient. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Deficient performance in this context means that counsel‘s performance fell below the standard guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id. When examining counsel‘s performance, an objective standard of reasonableness applies, id. at 688, and great deference is given to counsel‘s performance. Id. at 689. The defendant bears the burden to ―overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‗might be considered sound trial strategy.‘ ‖ Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). This Court has made clear that ―[s]trategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.‖ See Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000). There is a strong presumption that trial counsel‘s performance was not ineffective. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669. Second, the deficient performance must have prejudiced the defendant, ultimately depriving the defendant of a fair trial with a reliable result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. A defendant must do more than speculate that an error affected the outcome. Id. at 693. Prejudice is met only if there is a reasonable probability that ―but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.‖ Id. at 694. Both deficient performance and prejudice must be shown. Id. Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit court‘s factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing the circuit court‘s legal conclusions de novo. See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004).
Even if trial counsel‘s actions could be considered deficient, we conclude that Bradley has not met the prejudice prong of Strickland. To meet this prong, the claimant must ―establish prejudice and must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). We conclude that the second prong has not been met.
Although the strategy chosen by trial counsel and Bradley did not prevail, that fact alone does not render the strategy unreasonable or deficient. Were that the test, all defendants sentenced to death would have claims for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See Heath v. State, 3 So. 3d 1017, 1029 (Fla. 2009) (―The fact that this defense strategy was ultimately unsuccessful with the jury does not render counsel‘s performance deficient.); see also Henry v. State, 948 So. 2d 609, 616 (Fla. 2006) (―It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel‘s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence . . . .) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Accordingly, Bradley has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel was deficient in his investigation or presentation of mental health mitigation. Thus, the first prong of Strickland has not been established.
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that counsel‘s performance was not deficient, and even if it were, there is no reasonable probability that had counsel acted otherwise the result of the proceeding would have been different. Since our confidence in the outcome has not been undermined, no prejudice has been shown. Because neither the deficiency nor the prejudice prong of Strickland has been established, we conclude Bradley‘s claim that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to challenge the burglary charge in order to preserve the issue for appeal is without merit.
BRADLEY’S HABEAS CLAIMS
In Bradley‘s petition for habeas corpus he alleges appellate counsel was ineffective during the direct appeal to this Court. Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are appropriately raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1069 (Fla. 2000). In order to grant habeas relief on the basis of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, this Court must determine the following: [W]hether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and, second, whether the deficiency in performance compromised the appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the correctness of the result. Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986). ―The defendant has the burden of alleging a specific, serious omission or overt act upon which the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be based. Freeman, 761 So. 2d at 1069. With this standard in mind, we turn to Bradley‘s first claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
Bradley‘s first habeas claim, he contends that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the denial of his many commonly filed boiler-plate motions challenging the constitutionality of Florida‘s death penalty statutes. Nonetheless, Bradley has failed to set forth any basis upon which this Court could grant him relief. Instead, he simply refers the Court to his claims filed below. As we have previously held, vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient to warrant relief. See Doorbal v. State, 983 So. 2d 464, 482 (Fla. 2008) (―[T]o merely refer to arguments presented during the postconviction proceedings without further elucidation is not sufficient . . . and these claims are deemed to have been waived.‖); Thompson v. State, 759 So. 2d 650, 668 (Fla. 2000) (denying habeas claim, in part, as legally insufficient because defendant made only a conclusory statement without specific supporting facts). The purpose of a legal brief is to offer argument in support of the issues raised on appeal. See Doorbal, 983 So. 2d at 482. Bradley has failed to do this, and consequently, he has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that appellate counsel was ineffective. See Parker v. State, 904 So. 2d 370, 375 n.3 (Fla. 2005) (declining to review four issues that Parker raised on appeal because the claims of error were ―bare-bones‖ and conclusory). Accordingly, Bradley has failed to present a legally sufficient claim for habeas relief and this claim is denied as waived.
Accordingly, we conclude that Bradley has again failed to provide any basis upon which this Court might grant him habeas relief. As with his first habeas claim, because his presentation of the issues is legally insufficient, this claim is also denied as waived. Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court‘s denial of postconviction relief. We also deny Bradley‘s petition for writ of habeas corpus.
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